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attempt to perpetrate any rape, arson robbery or burglary ... kill[s]
another... shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree...." The
second degree murder statute,2 on the other hand, provides that every
person who "purposely and maliciously, but without deliberation and
premeditation, kill[s] another ... shall be deemed guilty of murder in
the second degree...."
All criminal homicide is considered one offense in Nebraska and
the surrounding circumstances determine the degree of the offense,
whether it be first degree murder, second degree murder, or man-
slaughter.3 In some states manslaughter is considered a distinct
offense rather than a degree of the crime of murder,4 but the better
view would seem to be that murder includes all degrees of felonious
homicide.r
In order to determine whether a purpose or intent to kill is an in-
dispensible element of murder in Nebraska, it is necessary to see
just what is meant by "deliberate and premeditated malice."
A. Malice
"Malice" is usually defined in Nebraska as "... that condition of
mind which is manifested by the intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause or excuse. It means any willful or corrupt in-
tention of the mind."6 This state of mind is necessary for a convic-
tion of murder, although in certain instances malice is implied. As was
suggested, malice can either be express or implied.
1. Express Malice
Murder of course can be committed with actual malice and such
intent to kill may be shown by direct evidence, such as a voluntary
confession or an admission. Express malice may also be shown by
circumstantial evidence which will support a verdict of guilty if the
jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence that the
accused intended to kill the victim. 7
At common law, express malice was inferred from the fact that the
accused committed the killing with no apparent provocation.8 This
was based upon the premise that the accused intended the natural
and probable consequences of his act, but such a rule placed an almost
-Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-402 (Cum. Supp 1951).
State v. Huter, 145 Neb. 798, 18 N.W.2d 203 (1945).
State v. Trent, 122 Ore. 444, 252 Pac. 975, rehearing denied, 122 Ore. 444,
259 Pac. 893 (1927); Folks v. State, 85 Fla. 238, 95 So. 619 (1923).
See Perkins, The Law of Homicide, 36 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 443
(1946).
1Pembrook v. State, 117 Neb. 759, 222 N.W. 956 (1929); Cate v. Smith, 80
Neb. 611, 114 N.W. 942 (1908); McVey v: State, 57 Neb. 471, 77 N.W. 1111
(1899); Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163, 61 N.W. 571 (1895).
7Hansen v. State, 121 Neb. 169, 236 N.W. 329 (1931).
1 Wharton, Homicide § 94 (3d ed. 1907).
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impossible burden upon the accused to prove that he had no intent to
kill. This rule was generally stated as a presumption of law, but was
contrary to the well known presumption, that the accused is innocent
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The rule was repudiated
in England in 1935, 9 but there is still authority for it in the United
States today. 10
In Nebraska it is said that the defendant in a criminal case may
testify directly as to his intention if it is an element of the crime
charged," and a presumption that the accused intended the natural
and probable consequences of his act is not implied except where
death is the result of the use of a deadly weapon.
a. Inference of Intent to Kill where the Killing is Unexplained or where Death is the Result
of the Use of a Deadly Weapon
In the case where the killing is unexplained or where death is the
result of the use of a deadly weapon, an inference of specific intent to
kill is drawn from the fact of the killing alone.' 2 But there is conflict
as to whether the inference still stands when there is direct evidence
other than the testimony of the accused.' 3 In Nebraska and some other
jurisdictions there is no presumption of malice and intent to kill from
the fact of the killing where there is other direct evidence.' 4 In such a
case, an inference of such intent is drawn from all the circumstances
and facts surrounding the act. As was suggested, in Nebraska, if the
killing alone is shown then the law is said to imply malice,'r but there
is authority to the effect that this inference is merely one of fact and
the jury is not required to infer specific intent and malice.' Since the
inference only raises a jury question as to the intent of the accused,
then such inferences of intent do not conflict with the Nebraska
" Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecution, [1935] A.C. 462.
"Wagner v. State, 183 Ark. 1153, 37 S.W.2d 86 (1931); Greer v. State, 159
Ga. 85, 125 S.E. 52 (1924); Commonwealth v. Bedrosian, 247 Mass. 573, 142 N.E.
778 (1924).
"Nichols v. State, 109 Neb. 335, 191 N.W. 333 (1922).
12 Coates v. State, 29 Ala. 616, 199 So. 830 (1941); State v. Emery, 236 Iowa
60, 17 N.W.2d 854 (1945); Durr v. State, 175 Miss. 797, 168 So. 65 (1936);
Riley v. State, 109 Miss. 286, 68 So. 250 (1915); State v. Jones, 86 S.C. 17, 67
S.E. 160 (1910).
11 (Holding that inference remains) Taylor v. State, 201 Ind. 241, 167 N.E. 133
(1929); Patton v. Commonwealth, 235 Ky. 845, 32 S.W.2d 405 (1930); State v.
Utley, 223 N.C. 39, 25 S.E.2d 195 (1943); State v. Capps, 134 N.C. 622, 46 S.E.
730 (1904).
'I'Veneziano v. State, 139 Neb. 526, 297 N.W. 924 (1941); Runyan v. State,
116 Neb. 191, 216 N.W. 656 (1927); Whitehead v. State, 115 Neb. 143, 212 N.W.
35 (1927); Flege v. State, 90 Neb. 390, 133 N.W. 431 (1911); Davis v. State,
90 Neb. 361, 133 N.W. 407 (1911); Lucas v. State, 78 Neb. 454, 111 N.W. 145
(1907); Simpson v. State, 31 Ala. App. 150, 13 So.2d 437 (1943); Erwin v.
State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876).
' Supra note 14.
"
8 Murphey v. State, 43 Neb. 34, 61 N.W. 491 (1894).
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statutes, requiring that the killing be done on purpose, and the jury
must still find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused com-
mitted the killing on purpose.
A problem presented in a case where death is the result of the use
of a deadly weapon is whether the court or the jury is the one to
determine if the weapon is a deadly one and whether or not it was
used in a deadly manner. In Nebraska, if the instrument used is one
likely to produce death or great bodily harm, then it is a question for
the court. If not, then it is a question for the jury; and this will depend
upon the manner of the instrument's use. Even though the instrument
may be deemed a deadly weapon as a matter of law, the jury must
always determine whether it was used in a deadly manner.17 Once
it is determined that the instrument is a deadly weapon and death
resulted from its use, then it is said that the accused is presumed to
have intended the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary
act.' 8 But as was pointed out above, no such presumption flows from
the use of a deadly weapon where eyewitnesses testify fully as to the
facts and circumstances surrounding the act committed. 19
b. Intent to Inflict Serious Bodily Harm, But not to Kill
A different situation arises, however, in a case where the accused
kills another, intending only to inflict serious bodily harm and not to
kill him. If for instance, the accused, being an expert shot, shoots at
another and kills him, but intending only to wound him, can such an
act ever constitute murder in Nebraska where the statutes require that
the killing be done on purpose or intentionally?
Logically, the answer to this question would appear to be no. But
if the only evidence of the lack of intent to kill is the defendant's testi-
mony, than an inference will be drawn from the fact of the killing and
it will be up to the jury to decide whether the defendant is telling the
truth or not.20 So even though the accused had no intent to kill and
the Nebraska statutes require that such intent be shown, it is possible
that the defendant could be convicted of murder, assuming of course
that there was no excuse or justification for the killing.
Moreover, at common law an intent to inflict grevious bodily harm
was treated as the equivalent of an intent to kill. It is possible, there-
fore, that the Nebraska Court might regard an intent to inflict serious
11 Krchnavy v. State, 43 Neb. 337, 61 N.W. 628 (1895).
' Luster v. State, 148 Neb. 743, 29 N.W.2d 364 (1947); State v..,McDaniels,
145 Neb. 261, 16 N.W.2d 164 (1944); Young v. State, 127 Neb. 719, 256 N.W.
908 (1934); Lillard v. State, 123 Neb. 838, 244 N.W. 640 (1932); Garofola v.
State, 121 Neb. 850, 238 N.W. 755 (1931); Swartz v. State, 121 Neb. 696, 238
N.W. 312 (1931); Johnson v. State, 88 Neb. 565, 130 N.W. 282 (1911); Lambert
v. State, 80 Neb. 562, 114 N.W. 775 (1908).
"Tvrz v. State, 154 Neb. 641, 48 N.W.2d 761 (1951).
^1 Sartz v. State, 121 Neb. 696, 238 N.W. 312 (1931).
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bodily harm as sufficient even though the statutes use the word
"purposely."
It might also be possible to sustain a conviction of murder, where
the defendant intended to inflict serious bodily injury but did not in-
tend to kill his victim, by us of the presumption that the defendant
intended the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary act
by using a deadly weapon.
It certainly seems in such a situation that a conviction of murder
should be sustained, particularly when death is substantially certain
to follow from such act, and that such consequences should be con-
sidered as though they were intended whether they were desired or not.
2. Implied Malice
In three types of cases the common law courts implied malice where
the killing was unintentional. Malice was implied when the accused
killed an officer while resisting lawful arrest, or where he killed an-
other while perpetrating a felony, or where the accused killed some-
one while engaged in an act so dangerous as to indicate to the accused
the existence of great peril to human life and safety.
a. Resisting Lawful Arrest
At common law an unintentional killing which was the result of
an attempt to resist a lawful arrest was deemed to constitute murder.
21
This was based upon the premise that the accused determined that he
would rather kill than be taken into custody. This rule is fictitious
in that the killing actually may have been accidental.
In a study of the modern cases which support this rule, it is ap-
parent that the accused would be guilty of murder on other grounds,
namely, the use of a deadly weapon or force in such a manner as to
create a situation which is dangerous to others without excuse or
justification. 22 In determining in such a case whether the accused is
guilty of murder, the test should not be the lawfulness or unlawful-
ness of the act which resulted in death but rather the element of human
risk involved in resisting the lawful arrest.2 3 Although the modern
"See Mackaley's Case, Cro Jac. 279, 79 Eng. Rep. 239 (1611); Yong's Case,
4 Co. Rep. 40a, 76 Eng. Rep. 984 (1587).2 See, for example, Glaze v. State, 156 Ga. 807, 120 S.E. 530 (1923); State
v. Zeibert, 40 Iowa 169 (1874); Kennedy v. State, 107 Ind. 144, 6 N.E. 305
(1886); State v. Mowry, 37 Kan. 369, 15 Pac. 282 (1887); Sexson v. Common-
wealth, 239 Ky. 177, 179, 39 S.W.2d 229, 230 (1933); State v. Albright, 144 Mo.
638, 46 S.W. 620 (1898); State v. Genese, 102 N.J.L. 34, 130 Atl. 642 (1925);
Love v. State, 15 Okla. Crim. App. 429, 177 Pac. 387 (1919); Wilson v. State,
79 Tenn. 310 (1883); State v. Morgan, 22 Utah 162, 61 Pac. 527 (1900).
.' Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 Yale L.J. 563-566
(1934).
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cases show other grounds to warrant a conviction of murder, there are
only a few cases which expressly repudiate the rule.24
The law in Nebraska is unsettled on this point. The only case on
the subject sets down the rule that a person may resist an unlawful
arrest to the point of killing the person attempting to make the arrest
if it is necessary to prevent such arrest,25 but held that the arrest was
lawful and the killing therefore not justified.,
b. Felony-Murder Doctrine
It was said that under the common law a killing in the commission
of a felony was murder .2  This rule was attacked by England's Judge
Stephen who argued that such a rule was not adequately supported by
authority.27 It was Stephen's view that "Instead of saying that any act
done with intent to commit a felony and which causes death amounts
to murder, it would be better to say that any act known to be danger-
ous to life, and likely in itself to cause death, done for the purpose of
committing a felony which caused death should be murder .... ,,28
The cases in the United States fall into several categories: (1) It is
sufficient to warrant a conviction of murder if a killing takes place in
the commission of any felony.29 (2) If a killing occurs in the com-
mission of certain dangerous felonies, usually arson, rape, robbery, and
burglary, then it is automatically declared to be murder.30 (3) Only
when the commission of the felony itself involves an appreciable human
risk then will a homicide during the commission of a felony constitute
murder.3 1 (4) Ohio apparently refuses to recognize the felony-murder
doctrine and requires that a purpose or intent to kill be shown to war-
" Regina v. Porter, 12 Cox C.C. 444 (1873); State v. Weisengoff, 85 W.Va.
271, 101 S.E. 450 (1919). See Dickey, Culpable Homicides in Resisting Arrest,
18 Cornell L.Q. 373, 376-379 (1933).
21 Simmerman v. State, 16 Neb. 615, 21 N.W. 387 (1884) (indicates Nebraska
might follow the lawfulness or unlawfulness test).
20Foster, Crown Law 258-259 (2d ed. 1791); 4 Bl. Comm. *192, *200-*210;
1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 86 (8th ed. 1824); 1 East, Pleas of the Crown
255-260 (1806).
27 3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 57-75 (1883).
"Regina v. Serve, 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1887).
21 People v. De La Roe, 36 Cal. App.2d 287, 97 P.2d 836 (1939); Simpson v.
Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 831, 170 S.W.2d 869 (1943); State v. Werner, 144 La.
380, 80 So. 596 (1919); Lovejoy v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 335, 194 Pac. 1087 (1921).
"Washington v. State, 181 Ark. 1011, 28 S.W.2d 1055 (1930); Cole v. State,
192 Ind. 29, 134 N.E. 867 (1922); State v. Schnelt, 341 Mo. 241, 108 S.W.2d 377
(1937); State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S.W.2d 1049 (1932); State v. Reagin,
64 Mont. 481, 210 Pac. 86 (1922); State v. Greenleaf, 71 N.H. 606 54 Atl. 38
(1902); State v. Compo, 108 N.J.L. 499, 158 Atl. 541 (1932); State v. Mays,
225 N.C. 486, 35 S.E.2d 494 (1945); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 316 Pa. 394, 175
Atl. 518 (1934); State v. Whitfield, 129 Wash. 134, 224 Pac. 559 (1924); State
v. Best, 44 Wyo. 383, 12 P.2d 1110 (1932).
"1 People v. Goldvarg, 346 Ill. 398, 178 N.E. 892 (1931); Williams v. Com-
monwealth, 258 Ky. 830, 81 S.W.2d 891 (1935); People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562,
199 N.W. 373 (1924).
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rant a conviction of murder.32 (5) In New York all murder which is com-
mitted in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any felony is
deemed murder in the first degree, but the doctrine is applied only in
those situations where the felony is independent of the killing.33
The Nebraska cases fall under the second category, automatically
making the killing a felony. The enumerated felonies under the Ne-
braska statute34 are rape, arson, robbery, and burglary. The statute
is interpreted as not requiring that the killing be done "purposely
and of deliberate and premeditated malice" in order to constitute
murder.35 It is said that all the statute requires is that the killing be
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any of the
enumerated felonies,3 and it is not essential for a conviction of murder
that the killing be one that would amount to murder rather than man-
slaughter in absence of the statute.37
However, one case in Nebraska would seem to qualify the felony-
murder doctrine where it is said that the killing must be the natural,
ordinary, and probable consequences of the act.38 That was a case
where a railroad watchman was killed while attempting to arrest
three men whom he had discovered in the act of robbing a freight car.
There was uncertainty as to which of the three men fired the fatal
shot but the defendant contended that he had left the scene of the
crime before the fatal shooting and that therefore the shooting did
not take place at the time he was attempting to commit a felony. The
defendant was found guilty of murder. The Nebraska Supreme Court
said that "Where one shares with others in the burglarious intent and
act, and killing results from it as one of its natural, ordinary, and
probable consequences he will not be heard to say that he did not intend
or share in it."
Since this qualification of the felony-murder doctrine has never
been invoked in a case where the defendant committed the actual kill-
" Turk v. State, 48 Ohio App. 489, 194 N.E. 425 (1934), aff'd, 129 Ohio St.
245, 194 N.E. 453 (1935).
" People v. Woodley, 273 App. Div. 421, 78 N.Y.S.2d 284 (3d Dep't 1948);
People v. Lazar, 271 N.Y. 27 2 N.E.2d 32 (1936); People v. Moran, 246 N.Y.
100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927); People v. Huter, 184 N.Y. 237, 77 N.E. 6 (1906).
' Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-401 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
MacAvoy v. State, 144 Neb. 827, 15 N.W.2d 45 (1944) (rape); Rogers v.
State, 141 Neb. 6, 2 N.W.2d 529 (1942) (robbery); Dean v. State, 128 Neb. 466,
259 N.W. 175 (1935) (robbery); Swartz v. State, 118 Neb. 591, 225 N.W. 766
(1929) (robbery); South v. State, 111 Neb. 383, 196 N.W. 684 (1923) (robbery);
Thompson v. State, 106 Neb. 395, 184 N.W. 68 (1921) (robbery); Keezer v.
State, 90 Neb. 238, 133 N.W. 204 (1911) (robbery); Taylor v. State, 86 Neb.
795, 126 N.W. 753 (1910) (rape); Pumphrey v. State, 84 Neb. 636, 122 N.W.
19 (1909) (robbery); Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88 N.W. 789 (1901) (robbery);
Morgan v State, 51 Neb. 672, 71 N.W. 788 (1897) (rape).
11 Supra note 35.
"Henry v. State, 51 Neb. 149, 70 N.W. 924 (1897).
" Romero v. State, 101 Neb. 650, 164 N.W. 554 (1917).
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ing in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate one of the enumerated
felonies, it is submitted that the qualification was only intended to
apply in a case where the defendant was a party to the attempted
felony and had escaped before the killing or had not actually fired the
fatal shot himself.
c. Negligent Homicide with Awareness of Greal Peril Io Life and Safely of Others
The difference between negligent homicide and intentional homicide
is simply a matter of degree. If the conduct of the accused involves
consequences substantially certain to follow then it is considered in-
tentional conduct whether the accused desired such consequences or
not. On the other hand, negligent homicide involves negligence of
the highest degree which is often characterized as wantonness or reck-
lessness and borders on intentional conduct. Despite Mr. Justice
Holmes' opinion, 9 the extreme danger to human life must have been
known to the defendant and it is not enough that a reasonable man
would have known of the peril.40
At common law malice was implied where the conduct of the actor
created such an extremely dangerous situation as to manifest a "de-
praved heart regardless of human life" even though the killing was un-
intentional. The acts of the killer were so extremely dangerous to
human life and safety of others that it was implied that he intended
to kill his victim, and it made no difference whether he desired such
consequences or not.4 ' This is the state of the law today except that
courts do not indulge in the fiction of implying intent. It is said that
such a reckless and wanton disregard of human life and safety, dis-
regarding all consequences, is with malice aforethought even if there
was no actual intent to kill or injure the victim. So on this basis a per-
son has been held guilty of murder if, without justification, or excuse,
he shoots into a crowd,2 house,43 train,44 or automobile, 45 where per-
" Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 52 Am. Rep. 264 (1884).
,1 Hyde v. State, 230 Ala. 243, 160 So. 237 (1935); State v. Massey, 20 Ala.
App. 56, 100 So. 625 (1924); State v. Shepard, 171 Minn. 414, 214 N.W. 280
(1927); State v. Weltz, 155 Minn. 143, 193 N.W. 42 (1923); State v. Trott, 190
N.C. 674, 130 S.E. 627 (1925).
' Mayes v People, 106 Ill. 306, 46 Am. Rep. 698 (1883) (statute repeating
common law).
'2 Bailey v. State, 133 Ala. 155, 32 So. 57 (1901); Pool v. State, 87 Ga. 526,
13 S.E. 556 (1891); Smith v. State, 124 Ga. 213, 52 S.E 329 (1905); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 372, 17 S.W. 220 (1891); Haynes v. State, 88
Tex. Crim. Rep. 42, 224 S.W. 1100 (1920); State v. Young, 50 W. Va. 96, 40 S.E.
334 (1901).
"Washington v. State, 60 Ala. 10, 31 Am. Rep. (1877); People v. Jerna-
towski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924); State v. Capps, 134 N.C. 622, 46 S.E.
730 (1904); Russell v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 590, 44 S.W. 159 (1898).
"Davis v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. Rep. 163, 211 S.W. 589 (1919); Banks v.
State, 85 Tex. Crim. Rep. 165, 211 S.W. 217 (1919); Aiken.v. State, 10 Tex.
App. 610 (1881).
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sons are known to be at the time. These are all cases where death is
substantially certain to follow and such conduct therefore may be
considered as intentional rather than negligent. In Nebraska, of course,
such convictions could be sustained on the theory that the defendant
intended the natural and probable consequences of his act from the
use of a deadly weapon.4 6
Where the conduct of the accused involves an unireasonable risk of
death or great bodily harm to others and where the degree of risk of
death is so high as to indicate wanton indifferences to human life and
safety accompanied by an awareness of such risk, then this conduct
was sufficient at common law to constitute murder, regardless of in-
tent. For example, if a person throws a heavy object off the roof of a
building, not knowing that another person is standing below, and the
object hits and kills that person then it was deemed to be murder.
Such evidence would not be sufficient for a conviction of murder
in Nebraska in so far as the statutes provide that the killing must
be done purposely. Furthermore, if the area below the building was
not congested and the defendant had no reason to believe that a per-
son was beneath him, then the consequences which followed the
throwing of the heavy object off the roof were not substantially certain
to follow and there is no basis for implying intent to kill. The highest
degree of conviction that could be obtained would be one of man-
slaughter.
B. Premeditation and Deliberation
Frequently "deliberate and premediated malice" is made an es-
sential element of first degree murder 47 and this is considered the dis-
tinction between first and second degree murder, both degrees requir-
ing the killing be committed purposely and with malice.4 s "Deliberate"
is defined as meaning maturely reflected,49 or that the act is committed
in a "cool state of blood."50 "Premeditation," on the other hand, means
"conceived beforehand"' 1 for some length of time, however short.52
The law fixes no particular length of time for premeditation and de-
liberation but each case is to be determined by the jury from the par-
"Wiley v. State, 19 Ariz. 346, 170 Pac. 869 (1918); Ex parte Finney, 21
Okla. Crin. Rep. 103, 205 Pac. 197 (1922); Davis v. State, 106 Tex. Crim. Rep.
300, 292 S.W. 220 (1927).
"I Supra note 18.
'
7 See, for example, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-401 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
"IVanderheiden v. State, 156 Neb. 735, 57 N.W.2d 761 (1953); Nanfito v.
State, 136 Neb. 658, 287 N.W. 58 (1939).
Pembrook v. State, 117 Neb. 759, 222 N.W. 956 (1929).
"State v. Bowser, 214 N.C. 249, 199 S.E. 31 (1938).
'
1 Pembrook v. State, 117 Neb. 759, 222 N.W. 956 (1929).
State v. Bowser, 214 N.C. 249, 199 S.E. 31 (1938).
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ticular circumstances surrounding the act.53 The time required may be
of the shortest possible duration such as any moment before the act
is committed,"4 or even at the moment the killing takes place.55 But
is this what the legislature had in mind when the statute was enacted?
The natural meaning of the words implies that the malicious act must
be one that is thought out over an appreciable length of time and it
follows that premeditation and deliberation cannot take place at the
moment of the killing. It is the deliberate, cold-blooded, planned killing
that the legislature had in mind as being indispensible to a conviction
of first degree murder. But of course one can ponder over the alter-
native of taking or sparing one's life, even before an intent to kill
that person takes shape in the mind. So if the killing is one where
premeditation and deliberation are essential to warrant a conviction
of first degree murder then it must be shown by the evidence that the
homicide was done purposely or intentionally; 6 that the intent to
kill was maturely reflected or pondered over and weighed in the
mind;57 and that the thought of taking one's life was pondered over in
the mind for an appreciable length of time before the act of killing was
comritted,5 8 although it is not essential that this reflection take place
after the intent was formed. 9
CONCLUSION
"It is apparent from the foregoing that in certain instances a specific
intent to kill need not be shown to sustain a conviction of murder in
Nebraska.
It is not necessary to show a specific intent to kill where only the
killing itself is shown. In such a case an inference of intent is drawn
from the fact of the killing alone. But if there is direct evidence of
intent other than the testimony of the accused, the inference of intent
is thrown out all together and under all circumstances it is left up to
the jury to determine whether they believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused is guilty. Where death is the result of the use of a
deadly weapon, the jury determines whether the instrument was used
in a deadly manner, and if it is so found by the jury then the accused
11Parker v. State, 104 Neb. 12, 175 N.W. 677 (1919); Francis v. State,
104 Neb. 5, 175 N.W. 675 (1919); Savary v. State, 62 Neb. 166, 87 N.W. 34
(1901); Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 16 (1868).5
'Savary v. State, 62 Neb. 166, 87 N.W. 34 (1901).
5
"Savary v. State, 62 Neb. 166, 87 N.W. 34 (1901).
" Luster v State, 148 Neb. 743, 29 N.W.2d 364 (1947); Nanfito v. State, 136
Neb. 658, 287 N.W. 58 (1939).57Bostic v. United States, 94 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1937); People v. Clayton,
83 N.J.L. 673, 83 Atl. 173 (1912); State v. Arata, 56 Wash. 185, 125 Pac. 227
(1909).
58 State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619, 627, 55 Atl. 743, 746 (1903).
19 People v. Russo, 133 Cal. App. 468, 24 P.2d 580 (1933).

